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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background 
Countries in the former Soviet Union (FSU) are encountering a rapidly increasing burden 
of HIV/AIDS, particularly among difficult to reach groups such as injecting drug users 
and commercial sex workers. Unfortunately, the high cost of many antiretroviral (ARV) 
medicines limits the ability of governments to purchase enough ARVs to treat 
HIV/AIDS. Costs to treat HIV/AIDS are likely to increase in the near future due to recent 
changes in World Health Organization (WHO) Antiretroviral Treatment Guidelines. First 
line ARV regimens recently recommended by WHO are substantially more expensive 
than first line regimens previously recommended by WHO.  In addition, it is expected 
that an increasing number of people currently on first line ARV regimens will soon need 
to switch over to second line ARV regimens that are much more expensive than first line 
regimens. 
 
Earlier research by Waning et al revealed extreme global variation in prices paid for 
identical ARVs. Such extreme variation in prices paid suggests that some countries may 
be able to obtain ARVs at lower prices and therefore redirect cost savings towards the 
purchase of additional ARVs to treat additional people. 
 
Purpose and Methods 
The purpose of this paper is to benchmark ARV prices of FSU countries against each 
other and against global and European region ARV prices. 
 
Specifically, we apply the benchmarking methodology, using publicly available ARV 
procurement data to: 
1. Assess the price variation that exists within and across countries of the FSU;  
2. Compare prices paid in countries against prices paid for identical products in all 
countries;  
3. Estimate potential cost savings if countries that paid in excess of global median prices 
purchased ARVs at global median prices. Convert cost savings into the number of 
people who could be treated with first line antiretroviral therapy (ART) for one year. 
4. Calculate the percent of procurements in which countries purchased a less 
expensive generic product, when available. 
 
Findings 
Twelve FSU countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) have 
received HIV/AIDS funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM), with $327.4 million dollars disbursed to date for HIV/AIDS.  These 
12 FSU countries have a total population of 273 million people with 2.4 million of them 
living with HIV. Fewer than 24,000 people were on antiretroviral therapy at the end of 
2006. Approximately 700 ARV procurement transactions totaling $59.69 million dollars 
were reported to GFATM over the time period July 2002-March 2008, with the Russian 
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Federation and Ukraine accounting for 85 percent of the total value of these ARV 
procurements.  
Variation in Prices Paid for ARVs Within and Across FSU Countries, 2006-2007 
We have recorded significant price variations for branded ARV dosages by measuring the 
ratio of the highest to lowest price paid in FSU countries for a given ARV dosage form.  
For brand name ARV dosage forms, a majority of the 19 different formulations analyzed 
showed price ratios from 2 to 6.  Price ratios for branded 3TC 150mg and ZDV/3TC 
300mg/150mg, were 33 and 59, respectively. For generics, only 1 of 14 different ARV 
dosages had a price ratio that varied by a factor of 6 or greater and the majority had price 
ratios less than 2. 
 
Even for repeated purchases of the same medicine, the price is often variable. For brand 
name didanosine 400 mg, within a given year the Russian Federation paid multiple 
prices, ranging from 4.4 to 14.7 times more expensive than the global median price for 
this ARV. For some generics, the global median price and the European median price are 
quite similar but this is not the case for brand name ARVs. 
 
Benchmarking FSU ARV Prices Across All Global ARV Purchases, 2002-2008  
In principle, countries should strive to have a high percent of their procurements at prices 
below the 50th percentile of all purchases, meaning that most of their ARVs were 
purchased at or below global median price. It would be most desirable for a country to 
have a high percentage of their procurements appear below the 25th price percentile.  
Kazakhstan and the Ukraine have 34% and 38%, respectively, of all their ARV purchases 
in the lowest quartile of reported prices, an impressive performance.  Several countries 
have purchased solid dosage form ARVs at prices less than the global median price, 
including Belarus (44% of all such purchases), Kazakhstan and Ukraine (51% each), 
Moldova and Tajikistan (42% each), and Uzbekistan (33%). The Russian Federation and 
Estonia pay the highest prices at  83%  and 95%, respectively, of all solid ARV purchases 
in the highest quartile of global procurement prices. Other countries paying high prices 
are Armenia and Kyrgyzstan with 69% and 86% of procurements, respectively, being in 
the 75th percentile or greater. 
 
Potential Cost Savings and Number of Additional People that Could be Provided ART if 
ARVs Were Purchased at Lower Prices 
Across the FSU region, a total of $31.9 million dollars was spent in excess of global 
median prices over the time period July 2002-March 2008. Given that the total amount of 
money spent on ARVs was reported to be $59.69 million, this $31.9 million excess 
expenditure accounts for more than half of the total amount spent on ARVs. Of this 
excess expenditure, $19.9 million dollars was ‘excess’ money spent by the Russian 
Federation. Ukraine spent an ‘excess’ amount of $7.9 million dollars and Estonia spent 
$2.3 million dollars. One important opportunity cost of paying more than the global 
median price for any ARV is that more people could have been put on treatment with 
ARVs if they were purchased at lower prices. 
 
In these FSU countries, the total number of additional people that could have been 
provided first line ART for one year if ARVs had been purchased at global median prices 
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ranged from 80,985 to 335,873, depending upon the ARV regimen.  This is 
approximately 3-14 times the total number of people presently on ARV therapy in these 
FSU countries. In the Russian Federation alone, approximately 50,446 to 209,219 
additional patients could have been provided with first line ART for one year if ARVs 
had been purchased at global median prices. Needless to say, the actual financial cost to 
the healthcare systems of FSU countries needed to treat these additional patients is likely 
far more substantial than just the cost of ARVs.  
 
Percent of Time FSU Countries Purchased a Less Expensive Generic ARV, When 
Available 
No consistent pattern emerges with regard to FSU countries choosing cheaper generic 
ARVs when both the generic and brand name ARV is available. When both generic and 
brand name ARVs were available, Tajikistan chose the generic version 92% of the time 
and Kyrgyzstan 100%, however these percentages are based on small numbers of 
reported procurements.  The Russian Federation and Estonia always buy brand name 
ARVs, regardless of whether the generic is available. When faced with this same choice, 
Armenia consistently purchases generics no more than 33% of the time.  Six of the 11 
FSU countries purchased less expensive generics 53-73% of the time.  
 
Discussion and Limitations 
In this paper we have shown that extreme price variation exists within and across FSU 
countries for identical ARVs. Price variation is greater for branded ARVs than for 
generic ARVs (Figure 1). When benchmarked against global median prices for ARVs, 
some FSU countries have done remarkably well at purchasing ARVs at lowest prices 
available, while other countries have consistently purchased ARVs at prices amongst the 
highest in the world for donor-funded programs (Figure 1, Tables 9-10).  For most ARVs, 
generic products are less expensive than branded counterparts; however some countries 
consistently purchase more expensive branded ARVs in lieu of purchasing less expensive 
generics.   
 
While this exercise highlights important findings on ARV price variability, it does not 
explain reasons for such variation. Highest prices may be a result information 
asymmetries, procurement inefficiencies, late payments to suppliers, insufficient lead 
times, tariffs, middleman mark–ups, and various regulatory and other legal barriers to 
product entry. Inadequate administrative structures, procurement systems and  regulatory 
capacities may lie at the root of inter-country price variations.  
 
Estimates of potential “cost savings” may or may not be realized because of many other 
countervailing factors outside procurement systems. Intellectual property barriers limit 
use of generic products and accurate, reliable patent information is notoriously difficult to 
obtain outside the United States, the European Union, Japan and Australia. Many brand 
name ARV manufacturers offer differential pricing schemes whereby some countries are 
offered cheaper prices than others. FSU countries are not treated consistently with regard 
to differential pricing. Furthermore, Estonia is a member of the European Union (EU) 
and it can parallel import pharmaceuticals from the other 26 EU member states. This 
activity encourages cross-country price variations. Two FSU countries are members of 
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the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) Consortium and may receive lower prices on 
some generic ARVs than non-Consortium members.   
 
It is important to note that despite GAFTM mandates to report ARV procurements, 
country compliance with GFATM reporting mandates appears to be <50%. It is not 
known how this missing data would affect results.  In addition, we suspect some prices 
have been inaccurately reported to GFATM and these errors may affect some results. 
 
Recommendations 
1. Disseminate report findings to civil society organizations who can help ensure ARV 
procurement transactions are reported to GFATM, assist researchers to further understand 
reasons for high ARV prices, and identify options for purchasing ARVs at lower prices.  
 
2. Include procurement indicators in GFATM monitoring and evaluation systems. An 
international stakeholder meeting should be held to gain consensus on a standard set of 
indicators. 
 
3. Conduct benchmarking exercises like these should on a routine basis.  Results should be 
disseminated and publicly available, consistent with policies and practices of the GFATM. 
 
4.  Make available ‘market intelligence’ on lowest possible ARV prices in each country 
and educate country procurement staff on use of these global databases. Procurement 
systems should be adapted to specifically incorporate the use of existing market 
intelligence into standard operating procedures and such systems should be mandated by 
donors. 
 
5.  Perform quality assurance on data that is being reported to public databases to ensure 
reliable ARV price information. 
 
6. Investigate reasons for under use of less expensive generic ARVs and create incentives 
to increase use of generic ARVs. 
 
7. Move beyond metrics-based benchmarking exercises, such as the examples used here, 
towards process-based benchmarking which would map ARV procurement processes 
against better peers.  
 
8. Conduct case studies in countries that consistently pay low prices for ARVs and 
consistently purchase less expensive generic ARVs.  These case studies should be used to 
inform best procurement practices. 
 
9.  Investigate high ARV price scenarios to better understand some of the reasons for this 
outcome. Some areas that are likely to contribute to higher prices and warrant further 
research have been identified in this report but are not meant to be an exhaustive list. 
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10. Implement policy and program interventions to address these high prices. 
Interventions should be monitored and evaluated to determine which interventions are 
most successful, replicable, and scaleable. 
 
Background 
The high cost of antiretroviral (ARV) medicines is one factor that hinders the ability to 
achieve global access to treatment for HIV/AIDS.  A funding gap exists between the 
amount of money available and the amount of money needed to treat those in need of 
HIV/AIDS services.1  In 2006 the WHO revised ART Guidelines2, introducing new first 
line ARVs, such as tenofovir, that are much more expensive than first line ARVs 
recommended in previous 2003 WHO Antiretroviral Treatment (ART) Guidelines3. 
Waning et al reported that countries are currently adapting to the newly revised 2006 
WHO ART Guidelines by switching to more costly 1st line regimens of TDF/3TC/EFV or 
TDF/3TC/NVP with 2008 global median prices of $394 and $281 per person per year, 
respectively.4 Prices for these newly introduced first line ARV regimens3 are currently 3-
4 times more expensive than first line regimens, such as d4T/3TC/NVP, previously 
recommended by WHO.4 The higher costs of first line regimens, along with increasing 
numbers of people transitioning onto more costly second line regimens, will result in 
dramatic increases in funding needed to provide ART.  
 
Efforts to achieve global access goals must include interventions to decrease prices paid 
for ARV medicines. Historically, efforts to reduce ARV prices have most commonly 
been directed at pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors, as well as governments 
imposing intellectual property barriers to generic access. However, recent research 
reveals dramatic differences in prices paid for identical ARVs within and across similar 
countries.4 This variability suggests there is room to build capacity and improve 
procurement systems within countries to obtain ARVs at lower prices.  
 
This paper focuses on prices paid for ARVs within donor-funded HIV/AIDS programs in 
countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, HIV 
prevalence increased more than 20-fold between 1995 and 2005 and by more than 33% 
from 2003 to 2005.5  In some of these countries, most notably in Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation with the largest populations, HIV prevalence is now estimated to be greater 
than 1% of the adult population.5  Only 21,000 of the 160,000 people estimated in need of 
ART in Eastern Europe and Central Asia were receiving ART at the end of 2006.5  With 
increasing HIV/AIDS prevalence, rising costs of ART, and limited resources devoted to 
health, FSU countries will be hard pressed to cover the costs of ART for this rapidly 
growing number of patients.   
 
In addition to financial constraints around ARV prices, access to ART in low resource 
settings is often hampered by inadequate policies and systems for drug registration, 
procurement, and supply chain management.6 The occurrence of ARV stock-outs in 
countries is evidence of inadequate systems to ensure consistent supplies of ARVs.6  
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It is useful, therefore, to compare procurement practices across countries in order to 
identify areas where interventions may lead to increased ARV access and to identify high 
functioning areas where case studies may inform best practice recommendations.  
Benchmarking, defined as "the technique of comparing business practices and 
performance levels between organizations to identify opportunities for making 
improvements in the economy, efficiency, or effectiveness of an organization's 
activities”7, is one method that can be used to compare ARV procurement prices across 
multiple countries. Benchmarking originated in the private sector but is now commonly 
used in the public sector. Although the public sector has different operational concerns 
and conditions, the organizational goals and objectives are similar to those in the private 
sector.8 Benchmarking is commonly used in other parts of the world across a wide variety 
of disciplines9. Benchmarking has become an intrinsic part of many healthcare systems as 
many countries use international health system comparisons to guide national health 
policy.10 To our knowledge, in the context of ARV procurement in low resource settings, 
price benchmarking has not yet been used. 
 
Purpose 
We apply the benchmarking methodology to a data base of ARV prices in order to: 
1. Assess the price variation that exists within and across countries;  
2. Compare prices paid in each country against prices paid for identical products in all 
countries;  
3. Estimate potential cost savings if countries that paid in excess of global median 
prices had purchased ARVs at global median prices. Convert cost savings into the 
number of people who could be treated with first line ART for 1 year. 
4. Calculate the percent of procurements in which countries purchased a less 
expensive generic product, when available. 
  
 
Methods 
Data Sources 
We obtained annual information on approved and disbursed funding, unadjusted for 
inflation, directly from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM).11 We obtained ARV procurement transactions reported to the GFATM   or the 
World Health Organization (WHO) from July 2002 through March 2008. Data were 
obtained from publicly available sources, the GFATM Purchase Price Report and the 
WHO Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GPRM).12,13 Awardees of the GFATM are 
required to report drug procurements to the Price Reporting Mechanism ; this information 
is then posted on the publicly available web-based Purchase Price Report.12  These data 
are also uploaded to the Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GPRM) database which 
includes data on medicine procurements for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.13 The 
WHO-hosted GPRM contains procurements reported by GFATM awardees, the Clinton 
HIV/AIDS Initiative, UNITAID, the International Dispensary Association, John Snow, 
Inc./DELIVER, Management Sciences for Health, Missionpharma, Partnership for 
Supply Chain Management, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the WHO Contracting 
and Procurement Service,  WHO staff members in country, and many others.14  These 
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databases mostly contain national procurements made with external donor funding and do 
not typically contain procurements from countries who are self–funding HIV/AIDS 
treatment.  
 
Data from these two sources were downloaded on March 31, 2008. Data was then coded 
and merged, removing overlapping procurements that were reported within and between 
both sources.  The analytic data set contained 11,684 ARV procurements representing 17 
antiretroviral medicines in 82 different dosage forms purchased by 103 countries. These 
procurements total approximately US $779 million.  For this paper, we restricted analyses 
to 704 procurements, comprised of solid dosage forms (e.g., tablet, capsule, etc) 
purchased by countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union.  
 
We adjusted all ARV prices for inflation, reported by GFATM and WHO in United 
States dollars, to the July 2006–June 2007 time period using United States annual 
Consumer Price Index.15 Antiretroviral prices are described as median annual price per 
tablet/capsule. We present median prices without adjusting for the impact of added costs 
due to shipping, insurance, and other charges (INCO terms). This is because the earliest 
observations were missing 90% of associated INCO terms. Furthermore, these types of 
add–on costs account for no greater than 15-20% of the total cost.16-17  
 
ARV Price Benchmarking 
To estimate excess paid above the global median price, we computed the difference 
between actual prices paid at country level and global median prices for each 
procurement (reported as price per tablet). We summed the excess prices paid then 
multiplied by the volume of the procurement across all procurements, adjusted for 
inflation,  to compute an estimated total potential cost savings in current US dollars.   
 
We also represented the potential savings in terms of additional medicines that could be 
used to bring more individuals into first-line treatment using 3 different first line 
regimens: 3TC/d4T/NVP, TDF/3TC/EFV, and TDF/3TC/NVP each purchased at global 
median prices of $95, $394 and $281 per person per year, respectively, as reported to 
GAFTM and WHO. 
 
# additional people on first-line 3TC/d4T/NVP = Total excess procurement cost/95 
or 
# additional people on first-line TDF/3TC/EFV = Total excess procurement cost/394 
or 
# additional people on first-line TDF/3TC/NVP = Total excess procurement cost/281 
 
 
ARV Generic Purchase Benchmarking 
In most scenarios, generic ARVs are less expensive than their generic counterparts; 
however, certain protease inhibitors are more expensive in generic form compared to 
brand forms.  For scenarios when generics are less expensive than brands, we calculated 
the percent of time countries purchased the generic version.  
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Results 
The demographics of countries included in this report are provided in Table 1.  We have 
analyzed 12 FSU countries having a total population of 273 million and varying income 
classifications.18 As of late 2006, HIV prevalence ranged from 0.1% in Tajikistan to 1.4% 
in Ukraine.5 HIV prevalence is less than 0.5% in 8 of 12 countries.5 A total of 2.4 million 
people are living with HIV/AIDS in these 12 FSU countries.5,18 Fewer than 24,000 
people or 1% of people living with HIV/AIDS are currently on ART.5 The number of 
people estimated with HIV/AIDS that are receiving ART ranges from 0.38% in 
Uzbekistan to 6.6% in Armenia.15  
 
Table 1. Country Demographics 
Country 
Population  
(in thousands)* 
GNI 
per capita 
($US)* 
World Bank 
Classification* 
Estimated 
Adult HIV 
Prevalence** 
People  
on ART** 
Armenia 3,010 $1,920 
Lower Middle 
Income 0.1% <200 
Azerbaijan 8,484 $1,840 
Lower Middle 
Income 0.1% <200 
Belarus 9,733 $3,470 
Lower Middle 
Income 0.3% 500 
 
Estonia 1,342 $11,400 High Income 1.3% 400 
Georgia 4,433 $1,580 
Lower Middle 
Income 0.2% 300 
Kazakhstan 15,308 $3,870 
Upper Middle 
Income 0.1% 400 
 
Kyrgyzstan 5,192 $500 Low Income 0.1% <200 
Moldova 3,833 $1,080 
Lower Middle 
Income 1.0% 400 
Russian 
Federation 142,500 $5,770 
Upper Middle 
Income 1.1% 16,000 
 
Tajikistan 6,640 $390 Low Income 0.1% <200 
Ukraine 46,788 $1,940 
Lower Middle 
Income 1.4% 5,000 
 
Uzbekistan 26,540 $610 Low Income 0.2% 200 
* Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators 2007. Washington DC: World Bank, 200718 
** Source: UNAIDS. 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. Geneva: UNAIDS, 20065 
 
A summary of HIV/AIDS grants approved by the GFATM for each of the FSU countries 
under study is provided in Table 2.  Amounts provided reflect funding for all HIV-related 
programs, both preventative and therapeutic. Over $525.7 million has been approved for 
FSU countries to date, with approximately 40% of the total FSU funding allocated to the 
Russian Federation.11  
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Table 2.  Summary of Funds Approved by the GFATM11 to FSU Countries In Unadjusted $US 
 Round  
 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Grand Total 
 
Armenia   $7,249,891           $7,249,891 
 
Azerbaijan       $10,341,550       $10,341,550 
 
Belarus     $16,763,830         $16,763,830 
 
Estonia   $10,490,805           $10,490,805 
 
Georgia   $12,125,644       $6,130,724   $18,256,368 
 
Kazakhstan   $22,085,999         $12,964,117 $35,050,116 
 
Kyrgyzstan   $17,073,306         $11,845,091 $28,918,397 
 
Moldova $11,719,047          $6,411,072   $18,130,119 
Russian Federation     $88,742,354 $119,873,915 $4,472,173     $213,088,442 
 
Tajikistan $2,425,245      $8,076,667   $4,889,461   $15,391,373 
 
Ukraine $101,281,695          $29,649,187   $130,930,882 
 
Uzbekistan     $21,075,841         $21,075,841 
Total $115,425,987  $69,025,645 $126,582,025 $138,292,132 $4,472,173 $47,080,444 $24,809,208 $525,687,614 
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The actual amount of GFATM HIV-related funding that has been disbursed in-country 
since July 2002 is provided in Table 3. Over $327 million has been disbursed and about 
64% of the total GFATM disbursements for FSU countries went to the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine.11   
 
Table 3.  Summary of Funds Disbursed by the GFATM to FSU Countries in Unadjusted $US11 
  
Country 
July 
2002-
June 
2003 
($US) 
July 
2003-
June 
2004 
($US) 
July 
2004-
June 
2005 
($US) 
July 
2005-
June 
2006 
($US) 
July 2006-
June 2007 
($US) 
July 
2007-
March 
2008* 
($US) 
Grand 
Total 
($US) 
  
Armenia   1,338,138  1,828,503  1,255,941  1,302,769 1,524,540 7,249,891
  
Azerbaijan     965,638 4,357,944 736,056  1,622,526 7,682,164
  
Belarus    2,817,200 2,942,470 3,713,476  987,028 10,460,174
  
Estonia    1,002,625 2,450,677 2,795,946 4,241,556   10,490,804
  
Georgia    810,321  1,851,088 2,609,496 1,665,261  5,990,215 12,926,381
  
Kazakhstan    2,275,154 3,926,845 3,842,976 2,754,859  6,362,166 19,162,000
  
Kyrgyzstan    283,985 3,004,393 4,166,160 3,959,442  812,662 12,226,642
  
Moldova  880,000 1,346,861 3,031,080 2,700,000 2,450,000  4,575,015 14,982,956
Russian 
Federation     22,330,950 21,190,052 48,573,673 33,045,529 125,140,204
  
Tajikistan 620,105 700,000 2,824,705 520,683 4,100,484  2,047,349 10,813,326
  
Ukraine 944,451 6,076,645 17,906,632 14,024,888 26,365,201 19,828,810 85,146,627
  
Uzbekistan    1,595,677 1,108,981 5,584,567  2,845,395 11,134,620
  
Total 2,444,556 13,833,729 64,533,388 61,515,537 105,447,344 79,641,235
 
327,415,789
*partial year 
 
Although money is being disbursed to FSU countries by the GFATM, it is informative to 
summarize ARV procurements that have actually been reported to the GFATM or WHO 
GPRM. This is provided in Table 4.  The blanks and fluctuations in the table suggest that 
reporting is incomplete and inconsistent. For example, since July 2003, Kyrgyzstan 
received GFATM funds across 5 different years (Table 3) totaling $12.2 million, but has 
reported just 11 procurements in only one of the 5 yearly time periods, totaling $79,252 
dollars reported to date (Table 4).  While it is not possible for us to estimate the percent 
of procurements that are actually reported to GFATM or WHO GPRM, the WHO 
estimates that GPRM represents about 50% of all donor-funded procurements for ARV 
medicines14. 
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In terms of expenditures on ARVs, the FSU countries have reported ARV purchases 
totaling $59.69 million dollars over the 6 year period. For this time period, the vast 
majority of funds expended for ARVs (85%), have been spent by the Russian Federation 
and the Ukraine.  
 
Table 4.  Country ARV Procurements (solids and liquids) Reported to GFATM or WHO GPRM* 
 
Total Number of ARV Procurements Reported to GFATM or WHO 
(Total Value in $US)* 
Country 
7/2002-
6/2003 
7/2003-
6/2004 
7/2004-
6/2005 
7/2005-
6/2006 
7/2006-
6/2007 
7/2007-
3/2008 
Grand 
Total 
Armenia   
4 
($10,793) 
3 
($1,618) 
34 
($53,190) 
10 
($28,850) 
51 
($94,451) 
Belarus  
2 
($143,924) 
19 
($760,158) 
13 
($262,898) 
20 
($421,541) 
5 
($81,752) 
59 
($1,670,273) 
Estonia   
6 
($248,197) 
3 
($62,443) 
12 
($1,419,630) 
3 
($1,107,086) 
24 
($2,837,356) 
Georgia   
17 
($115,842) 
10 
($111,321) 
38 
($676,476)  
65 
($903,639) 
Kazakhstan  
14 
($337,023) 
8 
($188,186) 
3 
($124,642) 
7 
($339,865) 
1 
($324,000) 
33 
($1,313,716) 
Kyrgyzstan   
11 
($79,252)    
11 
($79,252) 
Moldova 
3 
($99,502) 
17 
($87,078) 
17 
($110,547) 
22 
($225,843) 
12 
($188,658) 
17 
($328,746) 
88 
($1,040,374) 
Russian 
Federation    
27 
($4,355,540) 
37 
($18,264,047) 
9 
($3,918,540) 
73 
($26,538,127) 
Tajikistan   
1 
($18) 
13 
($42,817) 
9 
($36,885) 
4 
($29,313) 
27 
($109,033) 
Ukraine  
36 
($4,831,295) 
45 
($2,262,172) 
40 
($3,026,352) 
68 
($8,412,585) 
36 
($5,715,457) 
225 
($24,247,861) 
Uzbekistan   
1 
($104) 
16 
($171,275) 
26 
($517,971) 
15 
($167,570) 
58 
($856,920) 
Grand 
Total 
3 
($99,502) 
69 
($5,399,320) 
129 
($3,775,269) 
150 
($8,384,749) 
263 
($30,330,848) 
100 
($11,701,314) 
714 
($59,691,002) 
 
 
Price Variability for Brand and Generic ARVs Purchased by FSU Countries, July 2006-
June 2007 
There can be significant price variations within a year for both generic and branded ARV 
dosage forms. The range of prices for a given ARV dosage form can vary by more than 
10–fold.  We expressed the extent of price variation for solid ARV dosage forms as the 
ratio of the highest to lowest price paid in FSU countries. We present this price variability 
in Figure 1 for the time period July 2006-June 2007 as it contained the most current and 
comprehensive procurement data.  For branded ARV dosage forms, 4 of the 19 
formulations (21%) revealed price variation greater than 6-fold. A striking 33-fold and 
59-fold price ratio was noted for branded 3TC 150mg and ZDV/3TC 300mg/150mg, 
respectively. In eight of the 19 branded dosage forms (42%) prices varied by a factor of 2 
to 6 and the remaining seven branded dosage forms had price ratios less than 2. For 
generics, only 1 of 14 forms (7%) varied by a factor of 6 or greater.  Eight of the 14 
generic dosage forms (57%) had price ratios less than 2.  
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Figure 1.  Ratio of highest and lowest prices paid for Brand and Generic ARVs Purchased 
by FSU Countries, July 2006-June 2007* 
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*solid dosage forms only (e.g., tablets and capsules) 
 
Another means of comparing price paid across the FSU region is to compare prices paid 
in each FSU country to the global median price and the European median price for the 
identical brand or generic ARV purchased.  The global median price reflects the median 
price paid across all countries while the European median price reflects the median price 
across all countries belonging to the European region as classified by WHO. Table 5 
provides a cross-sectional view of a few ARVs purchased by FSU countries in the July 
2006-June 2007 time period whereby extreme price variation is noted when comparing 
individual prices paid by FSU countries to global median and European median prices for 
identical ARVs. In this exercise we divide the price paid by the country by the global 
median price to obtain a global median price ratio (GMPR). We also calculate a 
European median price ratio (EMPR) by dividing price paid by the country by the 
European median price. A complete analysis of procurements for the year is provided in 
Annex 1 (Tables 9 and 10).  
 
We note that there is occasionally extreme intra-country variability in price for repeated 
purchases of the same medicine. For example, for brand name didanosine (400 mg), the 
Russian Federation exhibits very high variability in price, with Global Median Price 
Ratio ranging from 4.4-14.7. There can also be significant inter-country variability for the 
same dosage form (Table 5). We also note the variability for generic efavirenz 200 mg 
with GMPR ranging from 0.95-2.29 and for brand name didanosine 400mg with GMPR 
ranging from 1.76 to 14.7.  For some generics, the global median price and the European 
median price are quite similar but the global median and European median prices for 
brand name ARVs are remarkably different (Table 5). 
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Table 5.  Select Examples of Price Variability Observed Within Country and Between 
FSU Countries, Jul 2006-June 2007 
 
 
 GENERIC ARV PRICES BRAND ARV PRICES 
 efavirenz 200mg efavirenz 600mg didanosine 
400mg 
LPV/RTV 
133.3mg.33.3mg 
Global 
Median 
Price 
0.21 0.6 0.79 0.28 
European 
Region 
median 
Price 
0.21 0.575 3.86 1.12 
Country GMPR
* 
EMPR
# 
GMPR
* 
EMPR
# 
GMPR
* 
EMPR
# 
GMPR
* 
EMPR
# 
Armenia 0.95 0.95 0.92-1 0.96-1 3.43 0.7 4.21 1.05
Belarus  0.9 0.94  1.79 0.45
Estonia  6.62-
6.95
1.35-
1.42 
Georgia 2.29 2.29  
Kazakhstan  0.35 0.37  6.96 1.74
Moldova   1.68 0.42
Russian 
Fed. 
 4.41-
14.66
0.9-3 5.14-
6.68
1.29-
1.67
Tajikistan  1.13 1.17  
Ukraine 1 1 1.76 0.36 1.86-4 0.46-1
Uzbekistan   1.53 1.6 3.66 0.75   
*GMPR= Global Median Price Ratio = Country Price/Global Median Price 
# EMPR= European Median Price Ratio = Country Price/European Region Median Price 
 
 
Benchmarking ARV Prices Across the Global Price Distribution 
There are multiple ways in which this data can be used to assess ARV prices and 
benchmark country performance.  In Figure 2, country procurements are grouped in 
quartiles of the global price distribution for identical solid dosage ARV products. Given 
the secular price trend downward, we benchmarked ARV prices within a given year, but 
summarized the performance over the entire July 2002-March 2008 time period.  
 
In this benchmarking exercise it is desirable for countries to have a high percent of their 
procurements appear below the 50th percentile, meaning that most of their ARVs were 
purchased at or below global median price. It is even more desirable for a country to have 
a high percent of their procurements appear below the 25th percentile, meaning prices 
paid were amongst the least expensive across all global procurements.  It would be 
undesirable for countries to have a high percentage of procurements above the 75th 
percentile. 
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Over the six year period, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, have 34% and 38%, respectively, of 
all their ARV purchases in the lowest 25th percentile of reported prices. Indeed, several 
countries have done well to purchase solid dosage form ARVs at prices less than the 
global median price (sum of <25th and 50th percentile bar segments in Figure 2) and 
these include Belarus (44% of all such purchases), Kazakhstan and Ukraine (51% each), 
Moldova and Tajikistan (42% each), and Uzbekistan (33%).  
 
Other FSU countries are consistently purchasing ARVs at prices higher than global 
median prices.  In the Russian Federation and Estonia, 83%  and 95%, respectively, of all 
solid ARV purchases are in the 75th percentile or greater as compared to the global 
median price. Other countries with similar performances are Armenia and Kyrgyzstan 
with 69% and 86% of procurements, respectively in the 75th percentile or greater. 
 
Figure 2. Country Benchmarking on Prices Paid for ARVs: Percent of Purchases in Global 
Interquartile Distribution of Prices (solid dosage forms only), July 2002-March 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*solid dosage forms only 
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Estimating Cost Savings and Number of Additional People That Could be Provided ART 
by Purchasing ARVs at Lower Prices 
If one country pays above the median price for a drug but could have paid less, this has a 
direct opportunity cost in terms of other potential uses of these funds, including the 
number of ARVs that could be purchased and used to treat additional people. As 
discussed in the methodology section, we compared the amount actually spent to what 
“would have been spent” if the country had paid the global median price for the drug.  
Table 6 shows these results as the ‘excess’ spending above the global median for all FSU 
countries over the entire time period, July 2002-March 2008. Across the region, a total of 
$ 31.9 million was spent in excess of global median prices, the vast majority, $19.9 
million, being spent by the Russian Federation. We note that, notwithstanding that fact 
that Ukraine spent an ‘excess’ amount of $7.9 million, they still managed to procure the 
majority of their solid form ARV procurement at prices below the global median price 
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(Figure 2).  Estonia spent $2.3 million dollars in “excess” of global median prices for 
ARVs. 
 
To measure some portion of the human cost of purchasing ARVs above global median 
prices, we determined the amount of medicine that could have been purchased and 
calculated the number of additional people that could have been provided these medicines 
for one year if ARVs had been purchased at global median prices. Table 7 shows these 
results for three first line ARV regimens: d4t/3TC/NVP, TDF/3TC/EFV, and 
TDF/3TC/NCVP. Across the FSU region, additional medicines corresponding to 80,985 
to 335,873 people treated for 1 year could have been bought if ARVs had been purchased 
at global median prices. In the Russian Federation, additional medicines corresponding to 
50,446 to 209,219 additional patients treated for 1 year could have been bought if ARVs 
had been purchased at global median prices. 
 
Table 6. Total Amount Spent Above Global Median in $US*  
(price paid/tablet – global median price/tablet) x (# tablets purchased) 
Country 
7/2002-
6/2003 
7/2003-
6/2004 
7/2004-
6/2005 
7/2005-
6/2006 
7/2006-
6/2007 
7/2007-
3/2008 
Grand 
Total 
Armenia     $6,007 $524 $23,880 $8,273 $38684
Belarus   $48,779 $211,906 $42,678 $143,290   $446,653
Estonia     $186,886 $44,559 $1,065,397 $1,047,790 $2,344,632
Georgia     $78,951 $42,719 $267,625   $389,295
Kazakhstan   $6,003 $68,972 $79,265 $127,998 $164,375 $446,613
Kyrgyzstan     $38,528       $38,528
Moldova $3,265 $15,668 $42,811 $36,285 $73,074 $11,725 $182,828
Russian Fed.       $3,014,320 $13,620,404 $3,241,038 $19,875,762
Tajikistan       $23,385 $3,912   $27,297
Ukraine   $2,312,888 $438,161 $1,227,263 $3,410,063 $529,946 $7,918,321
Uzbekistan     $6 $6,091 $112,854 $80,275 $199,226
Grand Total $3,265 $2,383,338 $1,072,228 $4,517,089 $18,848,497 $5,083,422 $31,907,839
*Adjusted for inflation15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20
Table 7. Total Amount Spent Above Global Median (July 2002-March 2008) 
and Number of People that Could be Provided First Line ART for 1 Year if ARVs Were 
Purchased at Global Median Prices 
Country 
Total Amount 
Paid Above 
Global Median 
# People treat 
d4t/3TC/NVP 
# People treat 
TDF/3TC/EFV 
# People treat 
TDF/3TC/NVP 
Armenia $38,684 407 98 138
Belarus $446,653 4,702 1,134 1,590
Estonia $2,344,632 24,680 5,951 8,344
Georgia $389,295 4,098 988 1,385
Kazakhstan $446,613 4,701 1,134 1,589
Kyrgyzstan $38,528 406 98 137
Moldova $182,828 1,925 464 651
Russian Fed. $19,875,762 209,219 50,446 70,732
Tajikistan $27,297 287 69 97
Ukraine $7,918,321 83,351 20,097 28,179
Uzbekistan $199,226 2,097 506 709
Grand Total $31,907,839 335,873 80,985 113,551
 
Generic Purchasing 
Table 8 provides interesting insight into the differential choices of different countries to 
take advantage of economies available when generic manufacturers provide products at 
prices below the brand name manufacturer.  Under these conditions, the Russian 
Federation and Estonia did not purchase any generics even when they were on the global 
market and less expensive than branded counterparts. Armenia also showed low 
preference for generics, purchasing generic alternatives only 23% of the time. Six 
countries (Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) purchased 
generic alternatives more than half (53-73%) of the time. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
showed the highest willingness to purchase generics at 92% and 100%, respectively; 
however these countries reported small numbers of procurements.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
 
Table 8.  Percent of time Countries Purchased Generic Versions of ARVs (when generic  
is available on the global market and the generic price is less than the brand price) 
 
 
Country 
July 2002-
June 2003 
 n (%) 
July 2003-
June 2004 
n (%) 
July 2004-
June 2005 
n (%) 
July 2005-
June 2006 
n (%) 
July 2006-
June 2007 
 n (%) 
July 2007- 
Mar 2008* 
n (%) 
Average 
n (%) 
 
Armenia     1/3 (33%) 0/1 (0%) 4/20 (20%) 2/6 (33%) 7/30 (23%) 
 
Belarus   0/1 (0%) 5/9 (56%) 4/7 (57%) 7/12 (58%) 3/3 (100%) 19/32 (59%) 
 
Estonia     0/3 (0%) 0/1 (0%) 0/8 (0%) 0/3 (0%) 0/15 (0%) 
 
Georgia     6/9 (67%) 4/7 (57%) 14/19 (74%)   24/35 (69%) 
 
Kazakhstan   4/7 (57%) 1/5 (20%) 0/1 (0%) 4/5 (80%) 1/1 (100%) 10/19 (53%) 
 
Kyrgyzstan     7/7 (100%)       7/7 (100%) 
 
Moldova 0/1 (0%) 6/7 (86%) 7/9 (78%) 10/10 (100%) 1/4 (25%) 0/5(0%) 24/36 (67%) 
Russian 
Federation       0/18 (0%) 0/28 (0%) 0/8 (0%) 0/54 (0%) 
 
Tajikistan       4/5 (80%) 6/6 (100%) 2/2 (100%) 12/13 (92%) 
 
Ukraine   4/22 (18%) 18/24 (75%) 22/23 (96%) 25/38 (66%) 9/14 (64%) 78/121 (64%) 
 
Uzbekistan     0/1 (0%) 4/6 (67%) 9/10 (90%) 6/9 (67%) 19/26 (73%) 
 
Discussion and Limitations 
We were able to benchmark ARV prices for various FSU countries based on the reporting 
of procurements by these countries to the GFATM. However, despite mandates requiring 
principle recipients of GFATM to report ARV procurement transactions, it appears that 
reporting is incomplete and we estimate compliance at less than 50% of the potentially 
available ARV transactions. Still, we have shown that information reported can be used 
to provide valuable insight towards understanding ARV procurement at country level and 
in identifying areas to be further investigated.  
 
In this paper we have shown that extreme price variation exists within and across FSU 
countries for identical ARVs. Price variation is greater for branded ARVs than for 
generic ARVs (Figure 1). When benchmarked against global median prices for ARVs, 
some FSU countries have done remarkably well at purchasing ARVs at the lowest prices 
available, while other countries have consistently purchased ARVs at prices amongst the 
highest in the world for donor-funded programs (Figure 1, Tables 9-10).  For most ARVs, 
generic products are less expensive than branded counterparts; however some countries 
consistently purchase more expensive branded ARVs in lieu of purchasing less expensive 
generics.  Based on available information, across the FSU countries presented here, up to 
335,873 additional people could have been treated with first line ART if countries that 
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purchased at prices above the global median were able to purchase ARVs at global 
median prices (Table 7). This is nearly 14 times the number of persons on ART in these 
FSU countries at the end of 2006 (Table 1). The actual cost to the health care system to 
treat these persons will be substantially greater than merely the “excess” costs of ARV 
purchases shown in Tables 6 and 7 since many other costs besides medicines (i.e., 
salaries, training, equipment) need to be determined before the ‘true’ costs of treatment 
are known. 
 
This benchmarking exercise pinpointed those countries that purchased ARVs at prices 
dramatically lower or dramatically higher than global prices.  Pharmaceutical 
management systems for ARVs in those countries purchasing ARVs at low prices should 
be further investigated to inform best procurement practices. Significantly, procurement 
scenarios where high prices were identified warrant further investigation to determine the 
reasons for high prices. In this report, we cannot definitively distinguish the reasons for 
excessive prices and high price variation. Overall, inadequate administrative structures, 
procurement systems and regulatory capacities may lie at the root of these inter-country 
price variations. Highest prices may be a result of many factors, including information 
asymmetries whereby purchasers in country are unaware of fair market ARV prices, 
tariffs, middleman mark–ups, and various regulatory and other legal barriers to product 
entry.  
 
While these benchmarking exercises have identified areas that may warrant further 
investigation to either learn best practices or intervene to obtain lower prices, several 
factors should be considered when interpreting the results.  Prices used for analyses were 
obtained from the GFATM or WHO Global Price Reporting Mechanism which contain 
ARV procurements made through donor-funded programs only. As noted earlier, 
compliance with reporting is estimated to be less than 50%. In addition, some countries, 
for example Azerbaijan, have just recently added price information to the GFATM from 
procurement orders placed in 2006. The data used in this analysis was downloaded on 
March 31, 2008. At the time of download, the Azerbaijan data from 2006 had not yet 
appeared in the GFATM or GPRM databases, so Azerbaijan was not included in this 
analysis. Other FSU countries may also have back-reported procurements of several years 
ago that will just now begin to show up on the GPRM. 
 
It is not possible to estimate how this missing data affected results for price variation or 
generic purchases.  If one could be certain that the ARV price information is 
representative of non-reported information, it would be reasonable to double the “cost 
savings” results to account for the 50% reporting deficit and to better reflect potential 
gains from buying less expensive ARVs. In addition, some country reports to GFATM 
may not be included in this report due to the time lag that exists between the time the 
country submits information and our regular download of data to update our working data 
file. For example, while Azerbaijan has submitted 20 reports to the GFATM, these 
procurements were reported after our most recent download of data and therefore are not 
reflected in this report. Further, databases used for these analyses do not contain 
information on country purchases made with internally generated tax dollars or insurance 
premiums.  
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Other considerations with this kind of data include variability with regards to what other 
charges are included in prices reported. For example, one country may report a price that 
represents only the cost of the drug, while another country may report a price that 
includes the cost of the drug plus shipping and handling charges.  As stated previously, 
however, it has been estimated, that any additional charges that may be included in the 
price represent no more than 15-20% of the drug price.16-17  While we cannot make any 
definitive statements about the role of these “add-on” costs, it is clear that add-on costs 
cannot account for the extreme variability observed for prices paid for some ARVs 
(Figure 1). 
 
We suspect that some of the ARV prices reported are erroneous. Inaccurately reported 
prices will certainly affect results. For example, we suspect a few of the extreme price 
variations (e.g. 3TC 150mg and ZDV/3TC 300mg/150mg) may actually be due to 
reporting errors.  In Figure 1, price variations are determined by dividing the highest 
price paid by the lowest price paid for each ARV. If countries reported purchase prices 
inaccurately, price variations depicted in Figure 1 would reflect some errors in reporting 
rather than actual prices paid. We suspect a few of the extreme price variations (e.g. 3TC 
150mg and ZDV/3TC 300mg/150mg) may actually be due to reporting errors.  Because 
we were unable to validate the original data, we did not attempt to remove outliers in this 
analysis. 
 
Global median prices often reflect purchase prices of generic products. Global median 
prices were used to benchmark procurement prices across the interquartile distribution of 
prices paid for same ARVs (Figure 2).  In countries where intellectual property barriers 
limit use of generic products, our estimates of potential “cost savings” could not be 
realized to the extent noted in this paper. Accurate, reliable patent information is 
notoriously difficult to obtain outside the United States, the European Union, Japan and 
Australia. At present, we do not know which, if any, of the ARVs under consideration in 
this report are patented in the FSU countries. We note that the Eurasian Patent 
Organization grants patents in nine countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan)19.  That 
said, Figure 1 reveals even more price variation among branded ARVs than exists among 
generic ARVs. The wide spectrum of prices paid for brand ARVs suggests that some 
countries may be able to purchase branded ARVs at lower prices, even if IP barriers 
prevent purchase of generic ARVs.  
 
Several other factors may affect ARV prices in FSU countries. Many brand name ARV 
manufacturers offer differential pricing schemes whereby some countries are offered 
cheaper prices than others. For the FSU countries under review, 5 different manufacturers 
offer a total of 7 differential pricing schemes (some manufacturers have multiple 
schemes). All countries reviewed are eligible for one or more pricing schemes from the 
manufacturers but Estonia and the Russian Federation are eligible for the fewest number 
of schemes (1/7 and 2/7, respectively). Thus, FSU countries are not treated consistently 
with regard to differential pricing. In fact, for 15 solid dosage form ARVs made by 
Bristol Myers Squibb and 6 made by GlaxoSmithKline, respectively, none of the FSU 
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countries are eligible for differential price schemes, even though countries in other parts 
of the world are eligible. In the same regard, two countries, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, are 
members of the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) Consortium. As a result, they may 
receive lower prices on some generic ARVs than non-Consortium members.   
 
We further note that, of the countries under review, Estonia is a member of the European 
Union.  Estonia can therefore parallel import pharmaceuticals from the other 26 member 
states of the EU (including its neighbors Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and the patent holder’s rights are 
considered to be exhausted.  Parallel trade tends to support cross-country price variations. 
 
 
Recommendations 
The results reported here highlight when low and high prices are paid for ARVs but we 
emphasize that the results do not explain reasons for price variations. We suggest the 
following next steps: 
 
1. Disseminate the findings of this report to civil society organizations such as The 
International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC)21 who can use their influence to 
ensure country ARV procurement transactions are reported to GFATM, assist researchers 
to further understand reasons for high ARV prices, and identify options for purchasing 
ARVs at lower prices.  
 
2. Include procurement indicators in GFATM monitoring and evaluation systems. An 
international stakeholder meeting should be held to gain consensus on a standard set of 
indicators. 
 
3. Conduct benchmarking exercises like these on a routine basis. Results should be 
disseminated and publicly available, consistent with transparent policies and practices of 
the GFATM.  
 
4. Make market intelligence on lowest possible ARV prices more easily available to those 
responsible for procurement in each country. Procurement systems should be adapted to 
specifically incorporate the use of existing market intelligence into standard operating 
procedures and such systems should be mandated by donors.  Data used for this present 
analysis are available to all national procurement agents, but many are unaware of the 
data, or do not know how to access and utilize it.  Using this type of market intelligence 
enables a purchaser to reject unreasonable prices by correcting an information asymmetry 
in which the bidder knows more about available prices than the purchaser.  If bidders 
know that purchasers use this data to benchmark quoted prices, they may feel forced to 
reduce the offered price.  
 
5.  Perform quality control of data reported to these publicly available databases. This 
will increase confidence in the reliability of ARV price information and resulting 
analyses. 
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6. Investigate reasons for under use of less expensive generic ARVs and create incentives 
to increase use of generic ARVs. 
 
7. Move beyond the metrics-based benchmarking used here and progress towards 
process-based benchmarking. Procurement can be improved by mapping out processes 
used in many countries and comparing to determine best practices. These agencies can 
adopt more effective processes and then continuously improve on these, benchmarking 
their performance against their peers. 
 
8. Conduct case studies in countries that consistently pay low prices for ARVs and 
consistently purchase less expensive generic ARVs. These case studies should be used to 
inform best procurement practices. 
 
9. Investigate high ARV price scenarios to better understand some of the reasons for this 
outcome. Some areas that are likely to contribute to higher prices and warrant further 
research have been identified earlier in this report but are not meant to be an exhaustive 
list. 
 
10. Implement policy and program interventions to address these high prices. 
Interventions should be monitored and evaluated to determine which interventions are 
most successful, replicable, and scaleable. 
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Annex  
Table 9. Country Comparison of Generic ARV Prices, July 2006–June 2007  
Armenia Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan Moldova Tajikistan Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Drug 
Global 
Generic 
Median 
Price 
Per 
Tablet 
Euro 
Generic 
Median 
Price Per 
Tablet 
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abacavir  
300mg 0,605 0,76     0.93-1.98 0.74-1.58         1.26 1 
efavirenz 
200mg 0,21 0,21 0.95 0.95   2.29 2.29       1 1   
efavirenz 
600mg 0,6 0,575 0.92-1 0.96-1.04 0.9 0.94   0.35 0.37   1.12 1.17   1.53 1.6 
lamivudine 
150mg 0,07 0,06   0.86 1 0.71-1.43 0.83-1.67     0.71 0.83 0.86-1 1-1.17   
nelfinavir 
250mg 0,26 0,24       0.92 1         
nevirapine 
200mg 0,08 0,07 1 1.14 0.88 1 0.75-1.13 0.86-1.29 0.88 1   0.88 1 0.13-0.88 0.14-1 1.13 1.29 
sta+lam 
30mg+150mg 0,1 0,095       0.9 0.95   1 1.05     
sta+lam 
40mg+150mg 0,1 0,15 1.1-1.9 0.73-1.27               
sta+lam+nvp  
40mg+150mg+ 
200mg 
0,14 0,195         1.36 0.97 1.43 1.03     
sta+lam+nvp 
30mg+150mg+ 
200mg 
0,14 0,185         1.29 0.97 1.36 1.03     
stavudine  
30mg 0,04 0,04             1 1   
stavudine  
40mg 0,05 0,04   0.8 1         0.8-1 1-1.25   
zid+lam 
300mg+150mg 0,19 0,21   0.95 0.86   2 1.81   1.11 1 0.84-1.11 0.76-1 1.21 1.1 
zidovudine 
100mg 0,07 0,07         1 1 1.29 1.29 0.86-1.29 0.86-1.29   
zidovudine 
300mg 0,17 0,185     0.88-1.29 0.81-1.19           
 
GMPR= Global Median Price Ratio = Country Price/Global Median Price 
EMPR= European Median Price Ratio = Country Price/European Region Median Price 
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Table 10. Country Comparison of Brand ARV Prices, July 2006–June 2007  
Armenia Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Moldova Russia Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Drug 
Global 
Brand 
Median 
Price 
Per 
Tablet 
Euro 
Brand 
Median 
Price 
Per 
Tablet 
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abacavir 300mg 0,87 0,93 1 0.94 1.07 1   1.52 1.42           
didanosine 100mg 0,21 0,39   2.95 1.59           1.81-1.86 0.97-1   
didanosine 250mg 0,64 1,68 2.63 1         2.63 1   1.52-2.17 
0.58-
0.83   
didanosine 400mg 0,79 3,86 3.43 0.7   6.62-6.95 
1.35-
1.42       
4.41-
14.66 0.9-3 
1.76-
1.76 
0.36-
0.36 3.66 0.75 
efavirenz 200mg 0,36 0,8 3.08 1.39 2.22 1   2.78 1.25     1.28 0.58     
efavirenz 600mg 0,79 0,98 3.29 2.65   2.62 2.11       0.82-1.24 
0.66-
1     
fosamprenavir 700mg 2,23 4,49       1.09-2.94 
0.54-
1.46           
lamivudine 150mg 0,1 0,86 0.9 0.1   30.1 3.5       6.7-8.6 
0.78-
1     
lop+rit 133.3+33.3mg 0,28 1,12 4.21 1.05 1.79 0.45     6.96 1.74 1.68 0.42 5.14-6.68 
1.29-
1.67 1.86-4 0.46-1   
nelfinavir 250mg 0,3 0,63 1.97 0.94       2.5 1.19 2 0.95   2.1 1   
nevirapine 200mg 0,6 7,79             4.7-24.42 
0.36-
1.88     
ritonavir 100mg 0,13 2,17 16.69 1   11.54 0.69 16.77 1         13.77 0.82 
saquinavir 200mg 0,31 0,67 1.9-2.03 
0.88-
0.94     
2.16-
4.84 1-2.24           
stavudine 30mg 0,1 1,155 14.3-26.7 
1.24-
2.31           
6.9-
8.8 
0.6-
0.76     
stavudine 40mg 0,1 0,88     30.3-31.7 
3.44-
3.6       
6.9-
8.8 
0.78-
1     
ten+emtri 300+200mg 0,89 1,64 1.73 0.94     1.96 1.06           
tenofovir 300mg 0,57 1,01 1.75-1.79 
0.99-
1.01     6.3 3.55   1 0.56       
zid+lam 300+150mg 0,35 1,33 0.94 0.25   0.2-11.89 
0.05-
3.13       
3.8-
4.89 
1-
1.29     
zidovudine 300mg 0,29 0,3 1 0.97 1.07 1.03               
 
GMPR= Global Median Price Ratio = Country Price/Global Median Price 
EMPR= European Median Price Ratio = Country Price/European RegionMedian Price 
 
 
 
